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1 Introduction
In the well-known principal-agent model with a risk neutral principal and
a risk averse agent we face the typical negative relationship between exoge-
nous risk and incentives: If risk is large and, hence, the risk premium (or
risk costs) from high-powered incentives would be high the principal will op-
timally choose low incentives for the agent. However, if risk is small so that
risk costs from induced incentives are rather low, the principal will prefer
high-powered incentives.
Prendergast (2002a) refers to several empirical studies which point to
a positive relation between risk and incentives and therefore challenge the
traditional view. Consequently, he offers alternative explanations for this
empirical puzzle (Prendergast 2002a, 2002b). In his modeling, he assumes
that the agent is risk neutral in order to abstract from the classical trade-off.
However, this assumption may be crucial. For example, if in Prendergast
(2002a) the agent were risk averse and high risk makes the principal prefer
output-based to input-based contracts, the well-known traditional trade-off
would apply again. Another explanation for the empirical puzzle is intro-
duced by Raith (2003). There, the positive relationship between risk and
incentives comes as a by-product. Raith assumes that agents are risk averse
so that incentives indeed imply risk costs. However, since agents face a bind-
ing participation constraint and principals always realize zero profits due to
market competition, neither the agent nor the principal (but society) has to
bear the risk costs from inducing incentives. Hence, less extreme competi-
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tion may lead to different findings concerning the trade-off. Finally, Wright
(2004) and Serfes (2005) independently develop a matching approach that
can explain the puzzle. If competition makes less risk averse agents match
with more risky principals, the outcome may be a positive relation between
risks and incentives.
However, in this paper we offer an alternative explanation for the empiri-
cal puzzle which does neither need risk neutral agents nor market competition
as a driving force. We only combine two standard contracting problems —
risk aversion and limited liability — which should be present in many circum-
stances so that this approach seems to be the most natural explanation for a
possibly positive relation between risk and incentives. The theoretical results
show that if the agent earns a positive rent in optimum and if his cost-of-
effort function is not to steep, higher exogenous risk will lead to stronger
incentives. In this situation, the principal strictly gains from increased in-
centives leading to higher output since he has not to pay for the additional
incentives which only reduce the agent’s rent. However, if in optimum effort
is not very sensitive to incentives the traditional trade-off will prevail.
Note that we restrict the set of possible contracts to linear incentive
schemes. This restriction is introduced for two reasons. First, most of the
empirical literature that challenges the traditional trade-off is based on linear
incentives schemes. Second, all of the cited papers that have dealt with
the given topic so far use a linear incentive scheme. Thus, adopting the
assumption on linear payment makes our findings directly comparable to the
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previous results.
2 The Model
We consider a typical principal-agent relationship between a risk neutral
principal P and a strictly risk averse agent A who has the utility function
u (I) with u0 (I) > 0, u00 (I) < 0 and I denoting A’s income. A produces
the output q = e + εr for P where e stands for A’s chosen effort and εr for
exogenously given noise with subscript r indicating risk. Let εr be distributed
over [−ε¯r, ε¯r] according to the density function fr (εr) with mean E [εr] =
0 and variance σ2r. In the following, we will distinguish two probability
distributions r = L,H with ε¯L < ε¯H and fL (εL) exhibiting second-order
stochastic dominance over fH (εH) which implies σ2L < σ2H (Hadar and Russel
1971, Theorem 3) so that distribution fH (εH) is more risky than fL (εL). In
other words, we can transform fL (εL) into fH (εH) by shifting probability
mass from the mean to the enlarged tails. There is the usual hidden-action
problem: P observes the verifiable output q but neither e nor εr. P also
knows A’s utility function and the probability distribution. A’s cost-of-effort
function is given by c (e) with c0 (e) , c00 (e) > 0 and c (0) = 0. We restrict the
set of possible contracts to linear payment schemes w = α+ βq. Hence, A’s
income is given by I = w − c (e) = α + βq − c (e). It is assumed that A is
protected by limited liability: P has to guarantee A a minimum payment so
that w ≥ wmin. A’s reservation utility is given by u¯ with u¯ = u (w¯). The
timing of the model is the usual one: First, P offers A a contract (α, β).
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Then, A accepts or rejects. Given that he has accepted P ’s offer, A then
chooses e. Finally, εr is realized and payments are made to P and A.
3 Optimal Linear Contract
P maximizes expected net profits (1− β) e−α subject to the incentive con-
straint, the individual-rationality constraint and the limited-liability con-
straint of the agent. A’s incentive constraint is given by
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
½Z ε¯r
−ε¯r
u (α+ β (e+ εr)− c (e)) fr (εr) dεr
¾
which, by using Jensen’s Inequality, can be rewritten as
e∗ ∈ argmax
e
{u (α+ βe− c (e)− ρr (β))}
with CE = α+βe−c (e)−ρr (β) being the certainty equivalent and ρr (β) > 0
the corresponding risk premium with ρ0r (β) > 0 and r indicating the underly-
ing probability distribution. The first-order condition u0 (CE) (β − c0 (e)) =
0 yields
e∗ = h (β) (IC)
with h (·) := c0−1 (·) denoting the inverse of the marginal cost function which
is monotonically increasing because of the convex cost function.1
The individual-rationality constraint, which guarantees A’s participation,Z ε¯r
−ε¯r
u (α+ β (e+ εr)− c (e)) fr (εr) dεr ≥ u¯,
1Note that the second-order condition u00 (CE) (β − c0 (e)) 2 − c00 (e)u0 (CE) < 0 is
always satisfied.
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can be simplified to
α+ βe− c (e)− ρr (β) ≥ w¯. (IR)
Finally, the limited-liability constraint has to ensure A his minimum wage
wmin even in the worst case with the lowest realization of εr:
α+ β (e− ε¯r) ≥ wmin. (LL)
To sum up, P maximizes expected net profits subject to (IC), (IR) and (LL).
Inserting (IC) into P ’s objective function, into (IR) and into (LL), the
principal’s optimization problem can be described by the Lagrangean
L (α, β) = (1− β)h (β)− α+ λ1 [α+ βh (β)− c (h (β))− ρr (β)− w¯]
+λ2 [α+ β (h (β)− ε¯r)− wmin]
with λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 denoting the respective Lagrange multipliers. Differentiation
with respect to α and β yields that in optimum we must have
λ1 + λ2 = 1 and (1)
−h (β) + (1− β)h0 (β) + λ1 [h (β) + βh0 (β)− c0 (h (β))h0 (β)− ρ0r (β)] (2)
+λ2 [h (β) + βh0 (β)− ε¯r] = 0
According to condition (1), in optimum either the individual-rationality con-
straint is binding (λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0) or the limited-liability constraint
(λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 1) which is also intuitively plausible since P does not want
to waste his money.
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First, consider the case of binding (IR). Substituting λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0
into (2) gives
h0 (β) = ρ0r (β) + c0 (h (β))h0 (β) .
Hence, if A does not earn a positive rent, P will choose optimal incentives
which maximize total welfare so that induced marginal returns equal the
sum of marginal risk costs and marginal costs of effort. Second, if A earns a
positive rent and (LL) is binding, λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 1 imply
h0 (β) = ε¯r (3)
which leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 If, in optimum, A earns a positive rent optimal incentives,
β∗, will be described by h0 (β∗) = ε¯r, otherwise by h0 (β∗) = ρ0r (β∗)+c0 (h (β∗))h0 (β∗).
Proposition 1 shows that on the one hand we may have the well-known
solution for risk averse agents (who are not wealth-constrained) where the
principal maximizes total welfare so that the usual negative trade-off between
risk and incentives should apply. On the other hand, agents may earn posi-
tive rents so that the binding limited-liability constraint directly determines
the optimal level of incentives. Let β∗ (σ2r) denote the optimal piece-rate
dependent on the risk of the given probability distribution r = L,H. From
(3), we immediately obtain the following corollary:
Corollary If A earns a positive rent in optimum and h (β) is convex, then
β∗ (σ2H) > β∗ (σ2L) so that risk and incentives will be positively related.
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The intuition for the interesting finding of the corollary is the following:
First, note that in case of a positive rent P does not have to pay for additional
effort costs and additional risk costs implied by higher incentives. These costs
are fully borne by the agent since his positive rent is decreased. Hence, given
a positive rent the usual trade-off between risk and incentives is overridden.
However, as the corollary shows, P is not always interested in increasing
the piece rate when ε¯r rises. P will only enhance incentives, if effort strongly
reacts to an increased piece rate, i.e. if h (·) is convex or, in other words,
if the cost function is not too steep (for example, if c (e) = e1.5 in case of a
polynomial cost function). If risk is shifted to the tails so that ε¯r increases, P
has to compensate A for this increase according to the (LL) condition. (LL)
shows that on the one hand P can decrease β in order to give the increase of
ε¯r a lower weight.2 On the other hand, P can counterbalance the increase in
ε¯r by an increase of effort e induced by a higher piece rate according to (IC).
Which of these alternatives is the better one from P ’s perspective, crucially
depends on the shape of h (·). If e∗ is very sensitive to incentives, P will
optimally choose a higher piece rate. If effort does not react very much to
increased incentives in the optimum since the cost function is very steep, P
will prefer to decrease the piece rate when ε¯r rises.
Finally, recall that plugging λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 1 into Eq. (2) yields
(1− β)h0 (β) + βh0 (β)− ε¯r = 0,
2Note that both α and wmin can be negative.
8
which points to a further aspect. The first term shows that increasing the
piece rate β also decreases P ’s share in produced output. Hence, it will
only be optimal for him to increase the piece rate, if his decreased share is
overcompensated by the increase of effort. To sum up, we need two conditions
for a positive relation between risk and incentives in a principal-agent model
— the agent must earn a positive rent so that the principal does not have to
pay for higher incentives, and effort must be rather sensitive to incentives.
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